1 .TH TOR 1 "February 2008" "TOR"
3 tor \- The second-generation onion router
6 [\fIOPTION value\fR]...
9 is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
10 service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
11 negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
12 knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
13 the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
16 Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
17 routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
18 around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
19 themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
22 Display a short help message and exit.
26 FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
30 Generates a hashed password for control port access.
33 \fB--list-fingerprint\fP
34 Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
38 Verify the configuration file is valid.
42 \fB--service [install|remove|start|stop]\fP
43 Manage the Tor Windows NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can
44 be found at http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService
47 \fB--list-torrc-options\fP
48 List all valid options.
52 Display Tor version and exit.
56 Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do
57 so. (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or
58 higher to the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)
61 Other options can be specified either on the command-line (\fI--option
62 value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR or
63 \fIoption "value"\fR). Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped
64 characters are allowed inside quoted values.
67 \fBBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
68 A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
69 to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
70 bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 5 MB)
73 \fBBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
74 Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the
75 given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
78 \fBMaxAdvertisedBandwidth \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
79 If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
80 BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
81 who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
82 advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their
83 server without impacting network performance.
86 \fBRelayBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
87 If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
88 usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of
89 bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same
90 value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
91 requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
94 \fBRelayBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
95 Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
96 _relayed traffic_ to the
97 given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0)
100 \fBConnLimit \fR\fINUM\fP
101 The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to
102 the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
103 many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this
104 by "ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then
105 Tor will refuse to start.
107 You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on
108 Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
111 \fBConstrainedSockets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
112 If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
113 sockets to the size specified in \fBConstrainedSockSize\fP. This is useful
114 for virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP
115 buffers may be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you
116 encounter the "Error creating network
117 socket: No buffer space available" message, you are likely experiencing
120 The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
121 the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this
122 configuration option is a second-resort.
124 The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
125 cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the
128 You should \fBnot\fP enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
129 space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
130 the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
131 time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
134 \fBConstrainedSockSize \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fP
135 When \fBConstrainedSockets\fP is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
136 all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048
137 and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
140 \fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
141 If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
142 connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
143 (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of
144 \fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP, setting
145 this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
146 control it. This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use
150 \fBControlListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
151 Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port,
152 bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We
153 strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're
154 doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
155 dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
156 This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
160 \fBControlSocket \fR\fIPath\fP
161 Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
162 socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
165 \fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
166 Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
167 knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP. You can
168 compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
169 \fIpassword\fP". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using
170 more than HashedControlPassword line.
173 \fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
174 If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
175 except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
176 "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
177 authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
178 security. (Default: 0)
181 \fBCookieAuthFile \fR\fIPath\fP
182 If set, this option overrides the default location and file name for Tor's
183 cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
186 \fBCookieAuthFileGroupReadable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fIGroupName\fP
187 If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read
188 the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file
189 readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
190 groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
191 reason.] (Default: 0).
194 \fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
195 Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
198 \fBDirServer \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
199 Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
200 address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
201 be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
202 servers. Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an
203 authority this directory is. By default, every authority is authoritative
204 for current ("v2")-style directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is provided, Tor will use this server as an
205 authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors
206 care about this.) Tor will use this server as an authority for hidden
207 service information if the "hs" flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and
208 the "no-hs" flag is \fBnot\fP set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge
209 authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. If a flag
210 "orport=\fBport\fR" is given, Tor will use the given port when opening
211 encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a flag "v3ident=\fBfp\fR" is
212 given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority whose v3 long-term
213 signing key has the fingerprint \fBfp\fR.
215 If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
216 directory servers. NOTE: this option is intended
217 for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If
218 you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't
219 believe the same authorities they do.
222 \fBAlternateDirAuthority \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
225 \fBAlternateHSAuthority \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
228 \fBAlternateBridgeAuthority \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
229 As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities.
230 Using AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory
231 authorities, but leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge
232 authorities in place. Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces
233 the default hidden service authorities, but not the directory or
237 \fBFetchDirInfoEarly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
238 If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
239 directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for
240 fetching early. Normal users should leave it off.
244 \fBFetchHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
245 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from
246 the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using
247 a Tor controller that handles hidserv fetches for you.
251 \fBFetchServerDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
252 If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
253 descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
254 you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
258 \fBFetchUselessDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
259 If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
260 authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching
261 useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running.
262 This option is useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist"
263 script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses.
267 \fBGroup \fR\fIGID\fP
268 On startup, setgid to this group.
271 \fBHttpProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
272 Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port
273 (or host:80 if port is not specified),
274 rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
277 \fBHttpProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
278 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Http proxy
279 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
280 Http proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
281 patch if you want it to support others.
284 \fBHttpsProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
285 Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port
286 (or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than
287 connecting directly to servers. You may want to set \fBFascistFirewall\fR
288 to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your Https
289 proxy only allows connecting to certain ports.
292 \fBHttpsProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
293 If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Https proxy
294 authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
295 Https proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
296 patch if you want it to support others.
299 \fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
300 To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive
301 cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the
302 connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM
303 seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
306 \fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBstderr\fR|\fBstdout\fR|\fBsyslog\fR\fP
307 Send all messages between \fIminSeverity\fR and \fImaxSeverity\fR to
308 the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system
309 log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized
310 severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using
311 "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose may provide sensitive
312 information to an attacker who obtains the logs. If only one
313 severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be
314 sent to the listed destination.
317 \fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBfile\fR \fIFILENAME\fP
318 As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log"
319 option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages
320 are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
323 \fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
324 Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
325 is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
326 of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
329 \fBPidFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
330 On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
333 \fBProtocolWarnings \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
334 If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties
335 not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with
336 severity 'info'. (Default: 0)
339 \fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
340 If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has
341 no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line
345 \fBSafeLogging \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
346 If 1, Tor replaces potentially sensitive strings in the logs
347 (e.g. addresses) with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be
348 useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information
349 about what sites a user might have visited. (Default: 1)
353 On startup, setuid to this user.
356 \fBHardwareAccel \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
357 If non-zero, try to use crypto hardware acceleration when
358 available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)
361 \fBAvoidDiskWrites \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
362 If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
363 This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only
364 a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
367 \fBTunnelDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
368 If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will
369 build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its
373 \fBPreferTunneledDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
374 If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
375 directory connections, when possible. (Default: 0)
379 The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSocksPort\fP is non-zero):
382 \fBAllowInvalidNodes\fR \fBentry\fR|\fBexit\fR|\fBmiddle\fR|\fBintroduction\fR|\fBrendezvous\fR|...\fP
383 If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
384 authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
385 recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
386 can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
387 "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
390 \fBBridge \fR\fIIP:ORPort\fR [fingerprint]\fP
391 When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
392 "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
393 is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
394 the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
395 fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
396 it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
399 \fBCircuitBuildTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
400 Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit
401 isn't open in that time, give up on it.
405 \fBCircuitIdleTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
406 If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds,
407 then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can
408 expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also,
409 if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of
410 the requests we're receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the
415 \fBClientOnly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
416 If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve
417 directory requests. The default
418 is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured. (Usually,
419 you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
420 you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.)
424 \fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
425 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, and address patterns of
426 nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example: ExcludeNodes
427 SlowServer, $ABCDEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, 255.254.0.0/8)
430 \fBExcludeExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
431 A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, and address patterns of
432 nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any node
433 listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
437 \fBEntryNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
438 A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
439 first hop in the circuit.
440 These are treated only as preferences unless StrictEntryNodes (see
444 \fBExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
445 A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
446 last hop in the circuit.
447 These are treated only as preferences unless StrictExitNodes (see
451 \fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
452 If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for
453 the first hop of a circuit.
456 \fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
457 If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for
458 the last hop of a circuit.
461 \fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
462 If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
463 your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see \fBFirewallPorts\fR). This will
464 allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
465 but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
466 If you prefer more fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead.
469 \fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
470 A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only
471 used when \fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. This option is deprecated; use
472 ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
475 \fBHidServAuth \fR\fIonion-address\fR \fIauth-cookie\fP \fIservice-name\fR
476 Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
477 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
478 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
479 purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
480 for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
481 this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible.
484 \fBReachableAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
485 A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you
486 to connect to. The format is as
487 for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood
488 unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses
489 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your
490 firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port
491 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise.
492 (Default: 'accept *:*'.)
495 \fBReachableDirAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
496 Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
497 these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
498 GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP
499 is used. If \fBHttpProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that
503 \fBReachableORAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
504 Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
505 these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set
506 explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP is used. If
507 \fBHttpsProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
509 The separation between \fBReachableORAddresses\fP and
510 \fBReachableDirAddresses\fP is only interesting when you are connecting through
511 proxies (see \fBHttpProxy\fR and \fBHttpsProxy\fR). Most proxies limit TLS
512 connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some
513 limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to
517 \fBLongLivedPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
518 A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
519 (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
520 ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a
521 node will go down before the stream is finished.
522 (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
525 \fBMapAddress\fR \fIaddress\fR \fInewaddress\fR
526 When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to
527 newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
528 connections to www.indymedia.org to exit via \fItorserver\fR (where
529 \fItorserver\fR is the nickname of the server),
530 use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
533 \fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
534 Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
537 \fBMaxCircuitDirtiness \fR\fINUM\fP
538 Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
539 but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old.
540 (Default: 10 minutes)
543 \fBNodeFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
544 The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
545 constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
546 servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a
547 NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself
548 (with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times.
551 \fBEnforceDistinctSubnets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
552 If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too
553 close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are
554 "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
556 .\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
557 .\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight.
558 .\" Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
562 \fBSocksPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
563 Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
564 applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
565 connections. (Default: 9050)
568 \fBSocksListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
569 Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
570 applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port
571 (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100).
572 This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
576 \fBSocksPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
577 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
578 SocksPort and DNSPort ports.
579 The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
582 \fBSocksTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
583 Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
584 unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it.
585 (Default: 2 minutes.)
588 \fBTrackHostExits \fR\fIhost\fR,\fI.domain\fR,\fI...\fR\fP
589 For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections
590 to hosts that match this value and attempt to
591 reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is
592 treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it
593 means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to
594 sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (ie log you out) if
595 your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
596 making it more clear that a given history is
597 associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe
598 this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
601 \fBTrackHostExitsExpire \fR\fINUM\fP
602 Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association
603 between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default
604 is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
607 \fBUpdateBridgesFromAuthority \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
608 When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
609 from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back
610 to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
613 \fBUseBridges \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
614 When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the
615 "Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and
616 directory guards. (Default: 0)
619 \fBUseEntryGuards \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
620 If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and
621 try to stick with them. This is desirable because
622 constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns
623 some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
627 \fBNumEntryGuards \fR\fINUM\fP
628 If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
629 as long-term entries for our circuits.
633 \fBSafeSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
634 When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
635 use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an
636 IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
637 Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
641 \fBTestSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
642 When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
643 each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used
644 a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
645 This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly
646 leaking DNS requests.
650 \fBVirtualAddrNetwork \fR\fIAddress\fB/\fIbits\fP
651 When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the
652 MAPADDRESS command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range.
653 (Default: 127.192.0.0/10)
655 When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like
657 change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or "172.16.0.0/12".
658 The default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP address range on a
659 properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface.
660 For local use, no change to the
661 default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP setting is needed.
664 \fBAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
665 When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
666 characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
667 resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
671 \fBFastFirstHopPK \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
672 When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
673 hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
674 already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
675 keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.
677 Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if
678 it's operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if
679 it doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop.
683 \fBTransPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
684 If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on \fR\fIPORT\fP (by
686 .\" This is required to enable support for \fBdns-proxy-tor\fP.
687 .\" ControlPort must be set when using \fBTransPort\fP.
688 Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
691 to use Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you'll want to examine
692 and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You'll also want
693 to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you'd like to proxy.
697 \fBTransListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
698 Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections.
699 (Default: 127.0.0.1).
700 This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server
701 to an entire network.
704 \fBNATDPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
705 Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD,
706 etc.) to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol.
707 This option is only for people who cannot
711 \fBNATDListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
712 Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections.
713 (Default: 127.0.0.1).
716 \fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
717 When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an
718 address that ends with one of the suffixes in
719 \fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP, we map an unused virtual address to that
720 address, and return the new virtual address. This is handy for making
721 ".onion" addresses work with applications that resolve an address and
726 \fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP \fR\fISUFFIX\fR,\fISUFFIX\fR,...\fP
727 A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with \fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP.
728 The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses."
729 (Default: .exit,.onion).
732 \fBDNSPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
733 If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves them
738 \fBDNSListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
739 Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections.
740 (Default: 127.0.0.1).
743 \fBClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
744 If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells
745 it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
746 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't turn
747 it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1).
750 \fBDownloadExtraInfo\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
751 If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These
752 documents contain information about servers other than the information
753 in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for
754 anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off.
758 \fBFallbackNetworkstatusFile\fP \fIFILENAME\fP
759 If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using
760 this one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use
761 it to learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on
762 the authorities. (Default: None).
765 \fBWarnPlaintextPorts\fP \fR\fIport\fR,\fIport\fR,\fI...\fP
766 Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an
767 anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed
768 to alert users to services that risk sending passwords in the clear.
769 (Default: 23,109,110,143).
772 \fBRejectPlaintextPorts\fP \fR\fIport\fR,\fIport\fR,\fI...\fP
773 Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses,
774 Tor will instead refuse to make the connection.
779 The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
782 \fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
783 The IP address or fqdn of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can
784 leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP address.
787 \fBAssumeReachable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
788 This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
789 don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
790 immediately. If \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP is also set, this option
791 instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and
792 list all connected servers as running.
795 \fBBridgeRelay \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
796 Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
797 from bridge users to the Tor network. Mainly it influences how the relay
798 will cache and serve directory information. Usually used in combination
799 with PublishServerDescriptor.
802 \fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail_address\fP
803 Administrative contact information for server. This line might get
804 picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact
805 that it's an email address.
808 \fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
809 Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
810 "\fBaccept\fP|\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP]\fB[:\fP\fIPORT\fP]".
811 If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
812 given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
813 denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). \fIPORT\fP can be a single port number,
814 an interval of ports "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP", or "\fB*\fP".
815 If \fIPORT\fP is omitted, that means "\fB*\fP".
817 For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would
818 reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and
819 accept anything else.
821 To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
822 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
823 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
824 These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your
825 exit policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
826 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option
827 to 0. For example, once you've done that, you could allow HTTP to
828 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with
829 "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that may also allow
830 connections to your own computer that are addressed to its public
831 (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more
832 details about internal and reserved IP address space.
834 This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
837 Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If
838 you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
839 either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_
840 (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
845 .IP "reject *:135-139"
849 .IP "reject *:4661-4666"
850 .IP "reject *:6346-6429"
852 .IP "reject *:6881-6999"
858 \fBExitPolicyRejectPrivate \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
859 Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP
860 address, at the beginning of your exit
861 policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
864 \fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
865 If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
868 \fBMyFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
869 Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
870 or organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames.
871 When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
872 will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the
873 other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
876 \fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
877 Set the server's nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1
878 and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters
882 \fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
883 How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
886 \fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
887 Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
890 \fBORListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
891 Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
892 servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
893 specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
894 This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
898 \fBPublishServerDescriptor \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fBv1\fR|\fBv2\fR|\fBv3\fR|\fBbridge\fR|\fBhidserv\fR, ...\fP
899 This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can
900 choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
902 If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its
903 descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're
904 testing out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
905 directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor
906 to all directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is
907 treated as a synonym for the default, which is currently "v2,v3".
910 \fBRedirectExit \fR\fIpattern target\fP
911 THIS OPTION IS DEPRECATED. It will go away in a future version of Tor.
912 Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect to one of a given set
913 of addresses, connect to \fItarget\fP (an \fIaddress:port\fP pair) instead.
915 pattern is given in the same format as for an exit policy. The
916 address translation applies after exit policies are applied. Multiple
917 \fBRedirectExit\fP options can be used: once any one has matched
918 successfully, no subsequent rules are considered. You can specify that no
919 redirection is to be performed on a given set of addresses by using the
920 special target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
924 \fBShutdownWaitLength\fR \fINUM\fP
925 When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close
926 listeners and start refusing new circuits. After \fBNUM\fP seconds,
927 we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. (Default:
931 \fBAccountingMax \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
932 Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given
933 accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period.
934 For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB
935 and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one
936 of the two reaches 1 GB.
937 When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
938 time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from
939 waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in
940 each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
941 enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
942 provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of
943 the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
947 \fBAccountingStart \fR\fBday\fR|\fBweek\fR|\fBmonth\fR [\fIday\fR] \fIHH:MM\fR\fP
948 Specify how long accounting periods last. If \fBmonth\fP is given,
949 each accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR on the
950 \fIday\fRth day of one month to the same day and time of the next.
951 (The day must be between 1 and 28.) If \fBweek\fP is given, each
952 accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR of the \fIday\fRth
953 day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday
954 as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If \fBday\fR is given, each accounting
955 period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR each day to the same time on the
956 next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
960 \fBServerDNSResolvConfFile \fR\fIfilename\fP
961 Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
962 \fIfilename\fP. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
963 "\fBresolv.conf\fP" file (7). This option, like all other
964 ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on
965 behalf of clients. Also, it only takes effect if Tor was built with
966 eventdns support. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
969 \fBServerDNSSearchDomains \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
970 If set to \fB1\fP, then we will search for addresses in the local search
971 domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
972 "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
973 connected to "www.example.com".
974 This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
975 behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
980 \fBServerDNSDetectHijacking \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
981 When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether
982 our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests
983 (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to correct
985 This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
986 behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
991 \fBServerDNSTestAddresses \fR\fIaddress\fR,\fIaddress\fR,\fI...\fP
992 When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these \fIvalid\fP
993 addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is
994 completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*".
995 This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
996 behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
998 (Defaults to "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com,
1002 \fBServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1003 When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
1004 containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
1005 exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
1007 This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
1008 behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
1013 \fBBridgeRecordUsageByCountry \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1014 When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we
1015 have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many
1016 client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge
1017 authority guess which countries have blocked access to it.
1020 \fBGeoIPFile \fR\fIfilename\fP
1021 A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
1023 .SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
1025 The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
1028 \fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1029 When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
1030 directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
1031 own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
1032 Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
1033 probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other
1034 admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
1037 \fBV1AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1038 When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
1039 generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
1040 Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
1043 \fBV2AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1044 When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
1045 generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
1046 described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers
1047 running 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
1050 \fBV3AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1051 When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
1052 generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
1053 described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers
1054 running at least 0.2.0.x).
1057 \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1058 When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on
1059 which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to
1060 the published directory. Each version 1 authority is
1061 automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities
1062 provide this service optionally. See \fBRecommendedVersions\fP,
1063 \fBRecommendedClientVersions\fP, and \fBRecommendedServerVersions\fP.
1066 \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1067 When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
1068 opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
1069 opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
1070 the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and
1071 fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers
1072 will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a
1073 registered binding. See \fBapproved-routers\fP in the \fBFILES\fP
1077 \fBHSAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1078 When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor also
1079 accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0)
1082 \fBHSAuthorityRecordStats \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1083 When this option is set in addition to \fBHSAuthoritativeDir\fP, Tor
1084 periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service
1085 usage to a file \fBhsusage\fP in its data directory. (Default: 0)
1088 \fBHidServDirectoryV2 \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1089 When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
1090 descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
1091 connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
1094 \fBBridgeAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1095 When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
1096 accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
1097 networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
1100 \fBMinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
1101 Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
1102 authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours)
1105 \fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
1106 Advertise the directory service on this port.
1109 \fBDirListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
1110 Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind
1111 to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
1112 This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
1116 \fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
1117 Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
1119 The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
1121 .SH DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
1125 \fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
1126 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
1127 to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
1128 pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
1129 option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
1131 When this is set then
1132 \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
1135 \fBRecommendedClientVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
1136 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
1137 to be safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
1138 directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
1140 When this is set then
1141 \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
1144 \fBRecommendedServerVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
1145 STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
1146 to be safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
1147 directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
1149 When this is set then
1150 \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
1153 \fBDirAllowPrivateAddresses \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1154 If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
1155 elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private
1156 IP address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
1159 \fBAuthDirBadDir \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
1160 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
1161 will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this authority
1162 publishes, if \fBAuthDirListBadDirs\fR is set.
1165 \fBAuthDirBadExit \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
1166 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
1167 will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
1168 publishes, if \fBAuthDirListBadExits\fR is set.
1171 \fBAuthDirInvalid \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
1172 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
1173 will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
1174 authority publishes.
1177 \fBAuthDirReject \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
1178 Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
1179 will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
1180 authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted
1181 for publication by this authority.
1184 \fBAuthDirListBadDirs \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1185 Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has
1186 some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not
1187 set this to 1 unless you plan to list nonfunctioning directories as bad;
1188 otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared directory.)
1191 \fBAuthDirListBadExits \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1192 Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has
1193 some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not
1194 set this to 1 unless you plan to list nonfunctioning exits as bad;
1195 otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit
1199 \fBAuthDirRejectUnlisted \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1200 Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server
1201 rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed
1202 in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get
1203 Sybiled. (Default: 0)
1206 \fBAuthDirMaxServersPerAddr\fR \fINUM\fP
1207 Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we
1208 will list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for
1209 "no limit". (Default: 2)
1212 \fBAuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr\fR \fINUM\fP
1213 Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but
1214 applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)
1217 \fBV3AuthVotingInterval\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1218 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred
1219 voting interval. Note that voting will \fIactually\fP happen at an
1220 interval chosen by consensus from all the authorities' preferred
1221 intervals. This time SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
1224 \fBV3AuthVoteDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1225 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred
1226 delay between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes
1227 from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not
1228 the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
1229 (Default: 5 minutes.)
1232 \fBV3AuthDistDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1233 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred
1234 delay between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it
1235 has all the signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the
1236 actual time used is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus
1237 of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.)
1240 \fBV3AuthNIntervalsValid\fR \fINUM\fP
1241 V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of
1242 VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for.
1243 Choosing high numbers increases network partitioning risks; choosing
1244 low numbers increases directory traffic. Note that the actual number
1245 of intervals used is not the server's preferred number, but the
1246 consensus of all preferences. Must be at least 2. (Default: 3.)
1249 .SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
1251 The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
1254 \fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
1255 Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
1256 service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple
1257 times to specify multiple services.
1260 \fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
1261 Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
1262 option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
1263 hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
1264 same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both
1265 by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
1266 multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that VIRTPORT,
1267 one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
1270 \fBPublishHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1271 If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
1272 advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful
1273 if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
1277 \fBHiddenServiceVersion \fR\fIversion\fR,\fIversion\fR,\fI...\fP
1278 A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
1279 service. Possible version numbers are 0 and 2. (Default: 0, 2)
1282 \fBHiddenServiceAuthorizeClient \fR\fIauth-type\fR \fR\fIclient-name\fR,\fIclient-name\fR,\fI...\fP
1283 If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
1284 only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose
1285 authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
1286 hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
1287 listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
1288 are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_
1289 (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible
1290 for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data
1291 can be found in the hostname file.
1294 \fBRendPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
1295 Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
1296 service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
1297 uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
1299 .SH TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
1301 The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
1304 \fBTestingTorNetwork \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
1305 If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
1306 so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
1307 non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.
1312 .IP "ServerDNSAllowBrokenResolvConf 1"
1313 .IP "DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1"
1314 .IP "EnforceDistinctSubnets 0"
1315 .IP "AssumeReachable 1"
1316 .IP "AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0"
1317 .IP "AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0"
1318 .IP "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0"
1319 .IP "ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0"
1320 .IP "V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes"
1321 .IP "V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds"
1322 .IP "V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds"
1323 .IP "TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes"
1324 .IP "TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds"
1325 .IP "TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds"
1326 .IP "TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes"
1327 .IP "TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes"
1332 \fBTestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1333 Like \fBV3AuthVotingInterval\fR, but for initial voting interval before the
1334 first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
1335 \fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
1338 \fBTestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1339 Like \fBTestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay\fR, but for initial voting interval
1340 before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
1341 \fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
1344 \fBTestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1345 Like \fBTestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay\fR, but for initial voting interval
1346 before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
1347 \fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
1350 \fBTestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1351 After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers are
1352 Running until this much time has passed.
1353 Changing this requires that\fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set.
1354 (Default: 30 minutes)
1357 \fBTestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
1358 Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this
1359 time. Changing this requires that \fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set.
1360 (Default: 10 minutes)
1366 Tor catches the following signals:
1370 Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
1374 Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
1375 slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
1376 (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
1380 The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing
1381 and reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its
1382 helper processes if applicable.
1386 Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and
1391 Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels
1392 by sending a SIGHUP.
1396 Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited,
1401 Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
1405 If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
1411 The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
1414 .B @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
1415 The tor process stores keys and other data here.
1418 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/cached-status/*
1419 The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
1422 .B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-descriptors\fR and \fBcached-descriptors.new\fR
1423 These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-routers file.
1426 .B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-routers\fR and \fBcached-routers.new\fR
1427 Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
1430 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/state
1431 A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in the file. These include:
1434 .IP "- The current entry guards and their status."
1435 .IP "- The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see below)."
1436 .IP "- When the file was last written"
1437 .IP "- What version of Tor generated the state file"
1438 .IP "- A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router descriptors."
1443 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/bw_accounting
1444 Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
1447 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/hsusage
1448 Used to track hidden service usage in terms of fetch and publish
1449 requests to this hidden service authoritative directory. Only used when
1450 recording of statistics is enabled.
1453 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/control_auth_cookie
1454 Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
1455 overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup.
1456 See control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication
1460 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/keys/*
1461 Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
1464 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/fingerprint
1465 Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
1468 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/approved-routers
1469 Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory\fP). This file lists nickname to identity bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by whitespace. See your \fBfingerprint\fP file in the \fIDataDirectory\fP for an example line. If the nickname is \fB!reject\fP then descriptors from the given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is \fB!invalid\fP then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended.
1472 .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/router-stability
1473 Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of how to set their Stable flags.
1476 .B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/hostname
1477 The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
1478 If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
1479 also contains authorization data for all clients.
1482 .B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/private_key
1483 The private key for this hidden service.
1486 .B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/client_keys
1487 Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by authorized
1494 .BR https://www.torproject.org/
1497 Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
1499 Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.