ui: avoid risk of 32-bit int overflow in VNC buffer check
commitdffa1de071aa956308172170107b7b60d99bf34b
authorDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Mon, 5 Feb 2018 11:49:35 +0000 (5 11:49 +0000)
committerGerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Fri, 16 Feb 2018 11:33:02 +0000 (16 12:33 +0100)
tree35de430dfbd92dd728d336c34b7b0b85891cb3f4
parent8dfa3061ce56d871dc9df1e264f05e7ec2fb50c1
ui: avoid risk of 32-bit int overflow in VNC buffer check

For very large framebuffers, it is theoretically possible for the result
of 'vs->throttle_output_offset * VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE' to
exceed the size of a 32-bit int. For this to happen in practice, the
video RAM would have to be set to a large enough value, which is not
likely today. None the less we can be paranoid against future growth by
using division instead of multiplication when checking the limits.

Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-id: 20180205114938.15784-2-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
ui/vnc.c