| commit | ab5a91a8364c3d6fc617abc47cc81d162c01d90a | |
| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | |
| Mon, 26 Nov 2007 23:47:46 +0000 (26 18:47 -0500) | ||
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | |
| Wed, 5 Dec 2007 13:24:30 +0000 (6 00:24 +1100) | ||
| tree | 0b7f4ef877f56be57f75b8b455b9f694f19da633 | treesnapshot (tar.gz zip) |
| parent | d313f948309ab22797316e789a7ff8fa358176b6 | commitdiff |
Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space
On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr. Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself. It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr. Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself. It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| security/dummy.c | diffblobblamehistory |