From f648104a0d44d7c551f8025ad7e50c4815d3b6eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Halcrow Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 01:27:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] eCryptfs: fix Tag 11 parsing code Fix up the Tag 11 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. Pay attention to *8* bytes for the key identifier (literal data), no more, no less. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index 72086141a6e..aedff506899 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -803,82 +803,60 @@ parse_tag_11_packet(unsigned char *data, unsigned char *contents, (*packet_size) = 0; (*tag_11_contents_size) = 0; - - /* check that: - * one byte for the Tag 11 ID flag - * two bytes for the Tag 11 length - * do not exceed the maximum_packet_size + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 + * packet tag 11 + * + * Tag 11 identifier (1 byte) + * Max Tag 11 packet size (max 3 bytes) + * Binary format specifier (1 byte) + * Filename length (1 byte) + * Filename ("_CONSOLE") (8 bytes) + * Modification date (4 bytes) + * Literal data (arbitrary) + * + * We need at least 16 bytes of data for the packet to even be + * valid. */ - if (unlikely((*packet_size) + 3 > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + if (max_packet_size < 16) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Maximum packet size too small\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* check for Tag 11 identifyer - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != ECRYPTFS_TAG_11_PACKET_TYPE) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, - "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* get Tag 11 content length - one or two bytes */ - rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, - &length_size); - if (rc) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, - "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); + if ((rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, + &length_size))) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); goto out; } - (*packet_size) += length_size; - - if (body_size < 13) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", - body_size); + if (body_size < 14) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", body_size); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - /* We have 13 bytes of surrounding packet values */ - (*tag_11_contents_size) = (body_size - 13); - - /* now we know the length of the remainting Tag 11 packet size: - * 14 fix bytes for: special flag one, special flag two, - * 12 skipped bytes - * body_size bytes minus the stuff above is the Tag 11 content - */ - /* FIXME why is the body size one byte smaller than the actual - * size of the body? - * this seems to be an error here as well as in - * write_tag_11_packet() */ + (*packet_size) += length_size; + (*tag_11_contents_size) = (body_size - 14); if (unlikely((*packet_size) + body_size + 1 > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet size exceeds max\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* special flag one - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x62) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unrecognizable packet\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Unrecognizable packet\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* special flag two - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x08) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unrecognizable packet\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Unrecognizable packet\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* skip the next 12 bytes */ - (*packet_size) += 12; /* We don't care about the filename or - * the timestamp */ - - /* get the Tag 11 contents - tag_11_contents_size bytes */ + (*packet_size) += 12; /* Ignore filename and modification date */ memcpy(contents, &data[(*packet_size)], (*tag_11_contents_size)); (*packet_size) += (*tag_11_contents_size); - out: if (rc) { (*packet_size) = 0; -- 2.11.4.GIT