Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module
commita8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c
authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Thu, 13 Aug 2009 13:44:51 +0000 (13 09:44 -0400)
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fri, 14 Aug 2009 01:18:34 +0000 (14 11:18 +1000)
tree10394b813c653933f4eb6034c5dc2bd4720cc837
parent8b4bfc7feb005d84e2bd0831d8331a304e9d6483
Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module

The networking code checks CAP_SYS_MODULE before using request_module() to
try to load a kernel module.  While this seems reasonable it's actually
weakening system security since we have to allow CAP_SYS_MODULE for things
like /sbin/ip and bluetoothd which need to be able to trigger module loads.
CAP_SYS_MODULE actually grants those binaries the ability to directly load
any code into the kernel.  We should instead be protecting modprobe and the
modules on disk, rather than granting random programs the ability to load code
directly into the kernel.  Instead we are going to gate those networking checks
on CAP_NET_ADMIN which still limits them to root but which does not grant
those processes the ability to load arbitrary code into the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c
net/core/dev.c
net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c