pci: use security_capable() when checking capablities during config space read
commitba5e8f48f799e61d865adb2830bb78fce3267762
authorChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Tue, 15 Feb 2011 01:21:49 +0000 (14 17:21 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Thu, 24 Feb 2011 22:54:29 +0000 (24 14:54 -0800)
tree981abf78d80bf77e038a98a2776513856368b7cc
parent50194161bee65819784a08b5b7d4f2a2320ed8c2
pci: use security_capable() when checking capablities during config space read

commit a628e7b87e100befac9702aa0c3b9848a7685e49 upstream.

This reintroduces commit 47970b1b which was subsequently reverted
as f00eaeea.  The original change was broken and caused X startup
failures and generally made privileged processes incapable of reading
device dependent config space.  The normal capable() interface returns
true on success, but the LSM interface returns 0 on success.  This thinko
is now fixed in this patch, and has been confirmed to work properly.

So, once again...Eric Paris noted that commit de139a3 ("pci: check caps
from sysfs file open to read device dependent config space") caused the
capability check to bypass security modules and potentially auditing.
Rectify this by calling security_capable() when checking the open file's
capabilities for config space reads.

Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Alex Riesen <raa.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@googlemail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c