| commit | 6b8b9a48545e08345b8ff77c9fd51b1aebdbefb3 | |
| author | Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> | |
| Tue, 10 Jul 2018 18:01:23 +0000 (10 19:01 +0100) | ||
| committer | Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> | |
| Tue, 24 Jul 2018 12:53:54 +0000 (24 13:53 +0100) | ||
| tree | 03edc816580eadf5c76be597c86eeec9a9aea11a | treesnapshot (tar.gz zip) |
| parent | b0960b9569db6b2fe8a75967d47b9dcdeb44016b | commitdiff |
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix possible spectre-v1 write in vgic_mmio_write_apr()
It's possible for userspace to control n. Sanitize n when using it as an
array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write gadget.
Note that while it appears that n must be bound to the interval [0,3]
due to the way it is extracted from addr, we cannot guarantee that
compiler transformations (and/or future refactoring) will ensure this is
the case, and given this is a slow path it's better to always perform
the masking.
Found by smatch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
It's possible for userspace to control n. Sanitize n when using it as an
array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write gadget.
Note that while it appears that n must be bound to the interval [0,3]
due to the way it is extracted from addr, we cannot guarantee that
compiler transformations (and/or future refactoring) will ensure this is
the case, and given this is a slow path it's better to always perform
the masking.
Found by smatch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
| virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v2.c | diffblobblamehistory |