score: fix off-by-one index into syscall table
commit5f4972712d070a70b2ac50c7f75a6b2dac1be74b
authorDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Fri, 20 Jan 2012 22:34:27 +0000 (20 14:34 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Thu, 26 Jan 2012 00:13:56 +0000 (25 16:13 -0800)
treed3dada775ca72517f24a223805bea9110198f2cd
parent8d7385000114bd38bdeb6ca175262b56aecd1931
score: fix off-by-one index into syscall table

commit c25a785d6647984505fa165b5cd84cfc9a95970b upstream.

If the provided system call number is equal to __NR_syscalls, the
current check will pass and a function pointer just after the system
call table may be called, since sys_call_table is an array with total
size __NR_syscalls.

Whether or not this is a security bug depends on what the compiler puts
immediately after the system call table.  It's likely that this won't do
anything bad because there is an additional NULL check on the syscall
entry, but if there happens to be a non-NULL value immediately after the
system call table, this may result in local privilege escalation.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.chen@sunplusct.com>
Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
arch/score/kernel/entry.S