From c05ce87c028b0dc487f3bb62602c3d0dfb2bd04d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerald Carter <jerry@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2004 12:31:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] r2947: applying changes for 2.2.12

---
 WHATSNEW.txt             | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 source/include/version.h |  2 +-
 source/smbd/vfs.c        |  1 -
 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index d076c510762..32038e1054a 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,85 @@
                  ==============================
+                 Release Notes for Samba 2.2.12
+                          Sept 29, 2004
+                 ==============================
+
+
+######################## SECURITY RELEASE ########################
+
+Summary:       Potential Arbitrary File Access
+
+Affected
+Versions:	Samba 2.2.x 
+
+Summary:	A remote attacker may be able to gain access
+		to files which exist outside of the share's
+		defined path. Such files must still be readable
+		by the account used for the connection.
+
+CVE ID:        CAN-2004-0815
+               (http://cve.mitre.org/)
+
+This is the last stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base.
+There will be no further Samba 2.2.x releases.
+
+-------------
+CAN-2004-0815
+-------------
+
+A bug in the input validation routines used to convert DOS
+path names to path names on the Samba host's file system
+may be exploited to gain access to files outside of the
+share's path defined by smb.conf.
+
+
+Protecting Unpatched Servers
+----------------------------
+
+Samba file shares with 'wide links = no' (a non-default
+setting) in the service definition in smb.conf are *not*
+vulnerable to this attack.
+
+The Samba Team always encourages users to run the latest stable
+release as a defense of against attacks.  However, under certain
+circumstances it may not be possible to immediately upgrade
+important installations.  In such cases, administrators should
+read the "Server Security" documentation found at
+http://www.samba.org/samba/docs/server_security.html.
+
+
+Credits
+--------
+
+Both security issues were reported to Samba developers by
+iDEFENSE (http://www.idefense.com/).  Karol Wiesek is
+credited with this discovery.
+
+-- 
+
+Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow
+
+       ------------------------------------------------------
+                 ==============================
+                 Release Notes for Samba 2.2.11
+                          Aug 12, 2004
+                 ==============================
+
+This is the latest stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base.
+
+Please note that the Samba 2.2 code tree will reach its End-Of-Life
+on October 1, 2004.  Administrators of existing Samba 2.2
+installations are encouraged to upgrade to the latest Samba 3.0.x
+release prior to that date.
+
+The Samba 2.2.11 release addresses the following bug:
+
+  o Crashes in smbd triggered by a Windows XP SP2 client sending 
+    a FindNextPrintChangeNotify() request without previously 
+    issuing FindFirstPrintChangeNotify().
+
+
+       ------------------------------------------------------
+                 ==============================
                  Release Notes for Samba 2.2.10
                           July 22, 2004
                  ==============================
@@ -27,8 +108,6 @@ the hash mangling method are encouraged to upgrade to Samba v2.2.10
 or v3.0.5.
 
 
-Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow
-
        ------------------------------------------------------
 
                  =============================
diff --git a/source/include/version.h b/source/include/version.h
index a7bb85e3be6..17549e1c7b7 100644
--- a/source/include/version.h
+++ b/source/include/version.h
@@ -1 +1 @@
-#define VERSION "2.2.11pre1"
+#define VERSION "2.2.13pre1"
diff --git a/source/smbd/vfs.c b/source/smbd/vfs.c
index c72a9a28874..3d3fb9c39ef 100644
--- a/source/smbd/vfs.c
+++ b/source/smbd/vfs.c
@@ -784,7 +784,6 @@ BOOL reduce_name(connection_struct *conn, char *s,char *dir,BOOL widelinks)
 	*dir2 = *wd = *base_name = *newname = 0;
 
 	if (widelinks) {
-		unix_clean_name(s);
 		/* can't have a leading .. */
 		if (strncmp(s,"..",2) == 0 && (s[2]==0 || s[2]=='/')) {
 			DEBUG(3,("Illegal file name? (%s)\n",s));
-- 
2.11.4.GIT